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The trial court did not unconstitutionally prevent the defendants-Fergusons from presenting a medical marijuana defense.

Also, it did not err by excluding evidence that Detective M presented a marijuana patient card. It did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of marijuana, scales, and packaging found at defendants' house. Further, there was sufficient evidence supporting defendant-Diane Ferguson's conviction of aiding and abetting the delivery of marijuana during the second marijuana transaction. Finally, the trial court did not clearly err when it found that M did not instigate Diane to commit a crime. M testified that he responded to a marijuana sales posting on Craigslist. "Transactions outside the scope of the MMMA rebut the presumption that a caregiver was engaged in the medical use of marijuana." MMMA § 8(a) "provides that any patient or primary caregiver may assert an affirmative defense to a marijuana-related offense." However, if a defendant does not present prima facie "evidence of each element of § 8 by 'present[ing] evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that the defendant satisfied the elements of the § 8 affirmative defense, . . . then the circuit court must deny the motion to dismiss the charges' and 'the defendant is not permitted to present the § 8 defense to the jury.'" The Fergusons argued that the trial court unconstitutionally prevented them from presenting a defense when it prohibited them from presenting evidence relating to medical marijuana. They did not challenge the trial court's findings after the evidentiary hearing-they did not contend that it improperly determined that they lacked MMMA immunity under § 4 and failed to present evidence as to § 8. They instead contended that the trial court should have allowed them to present medical marijuana-related evidence to the jury: specifically, that M presented a patient card. The court rejected this argument. They "did not comply with the rules necessary to present a medical marijuana defense." Affirmed.

MICHIGAN REAL ESTATE 95: Property owners did not place a condition upon the delivery of the deed; rather, they delivered the deed to themselves.

When the delivery of a deed is contingent upon the happening of some future event, title to the subject property will not transfer to the grantee until the event has occurred. However, in this case A and J did not place a condition upon the delivery of the deed; rather, they delivered the deed to themselves, then deposited the deed with their attorney with the instruction to record the deed only upon the happening of a future event, thereby placing a condition only upon the recording of the deed.

MICHIGAN PROBATE 57: Brother granted permanent guardianship of siblings.

At a multiday hearing to address the extension of the guardianship, the eldest children, the mother’s relatives and friends, and school personnel testified regarding the mother’s care of the children, appellant’s treatment of and interaction with the children, and the eldest siblings’ role in aiding the mother to raise the children.

FAMILY LAW 88: The trial court found that the children did not have an established custodial environment with defendant because, before the separation, he did not have a large role in the children’s lives.

The trial court credited plaintiff’s testimony that, before the parties’ separation, defendant spent minimal time helping to care for the children, so its finding that the children would not have looked to defendant for guidance, discipline, the necessities of life, and parental comfort during that time was not against the great weight of the evidence.

REAL ESTATE 89: RM had not included any language in the deed providing that the property was a joint tenancy with full rights of survivorship, the property instead became a tenancy in common.

RM drafted the deed without seeking counsel and mistakenly believed that, if either she or FK died, the property would fully pass to the surviving tenant. FK’s will provided that if his wife predeceased him—which she did—the personal representative of his estate should sell any residual property that he owned and divide the cash proceeds equally among his surviving children.

FAMILY LAW 83: A trial court can terminate a parent’s rights and permit a stepparent to adopt a child.

A trial court has discretion to terminate a parent’s rights and permit a stepparent to adopt a child when the conditions of MCL 710.51(6) are met. MCL 710.51(6)(b) requires the petitioner to establish that the other parent had the ability to visit, contact, or communicate with the children, and substantially failed or neglected to do so for a period of two years.

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