Separate assets may lose their character as separate property and transform into marital property if they are commingled with marital assets and treated by the parties as marital property.
Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred by declining to consider the possible tax consequences arising from the selected distribution method.
The trial court’s observation that defendant was able to live in the house rent-free for 14 years was an additional equitable reason for rejecting defendant’s claim that she should be awarded part of the value of the real property.
The fact that this agreement as to custody and parenting time did not resolve all the disputes between the parties, with the court recognizing that some other little things purportedly agreed to at mediation were going to be added to the judgment, does not render the partial agreement invalid. Plaintiff is entitled to a trial on these remaining, unresolved issues.
In deciding issues on appeal involving division of marital property, the Court first reviews the trial court’s findings of fact.
In order to provide security for the payment of his support obligations in the event of his death, the judgment also ordered decedent to irrevocably designate the minor children of the parties as the beneficiary on any and all life insurance policies presently outstanding upon his life, until his duty to support shall cease.
Defendant’s attorney stated that the total fees incurred by both sides are far beyond what he usually sees in divorce cases. Regarding the reasonableness of five depositions, he testified that he has not conducted five depositions in an average divorce case in the last few years.
At that hearing, the trial court signed the proffered judgment of divorce, which it now characterized as a default judgment despite the fact that no default had been entered, nor had plaintiff ever filed a motion for entry of default judgment.
The Michigan statute governing spousal support favors a case-by-case approach to determining spousal support.
At issue in this case is whether Plaintiff satisfied the jurisdictional residency requirement contained in MCL 552.9(1), which provides that a judgment of divorce shall not be granted by a court in this state in an action for divorce unless the complainant or defendant has resided in this state for 180 days immediately preceding the filing of the complaint.
In essence, while a bankruptcy court could discharge the debts, they still remained owing to that party to whom they were payable as support, which is not dischargeable.
With regard to defendant’s income, the trial court found that defendant earned an average of $15,300 per year from his drywall business and $120,000 per year from his medical marijuana grow operation during that same period.
Despite having signed the proposed divorce judgment, defendant filed an answer to the divorce complaint on February 28, 2017, and on March 2, 2017, she filed a response to plaintiff’s motion for entry of proofs and judgment, along with a motion to restore her possession of the marital home. Defendant claimed arguments premised on unconscionability.
To award fees on the basis of misconduct, the trial court must determine that misconduct, in fact, occurred and that the misconduct caused the party seeking fees to incur the fees awarded.
Plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in extending the status quo beyond entry of the JOD. Pursuant to MCR 3.207(C)(5), a temporary order remains in effect until modified or until the entry of the final judgment or order.
The appeals court agreed with the trial court that plaintiff’s conduct in filing for divorce in another county while the Oakland County divorce judgment was still in effect violated that judgment of divorce.
The circuit court entered a default judgment of divorce ordering Defendant to pay Plaintiff $2,000 in spousal support each month. Only then did Defendant realize the divorce would not be as easy as he anticipated.
Separate assets may lose their character as separate property and transform into marital property if they are commingled with marital assets and treated by the parties as marital property.
The trial court concluded that the home was marital property subject to division because defendant contributed to the marital home by working on it; plaintiff and defendant lived together in the home for two years; and defendant paid for the expenses of the home for six months.
Plaintiff argues that failing to place a value on defendant’s two businesses and awarding them to defendant, is depriving plaintiff of assets to which she is entitled.
Although the trial court recognized that a marital estate will normally be divided 50/50, it elected to award 60% to defendant and 40% to plaintiff.
The fact that an asset is obtained as a separate asset does not mean its status cannot change. Separate assets may lose their character as separate property and transform into marital property.
The Court recognizes that the object in awarding spousal support is to balance the incomes and needs of the parties so that neither will be impoverished; spousal support is to be based on what is just and reasonable under the circumstances of the case.
This dispute appears to be whether the arbitrator effectively modified the parties’ Uniform Spousal Support Order by awarding plaintiff 19.5% of the profits from the sale of defendant’s stock.
The court ruled that the husband’s home was a premarital asset belonging to him alone, denied the wife’s request for spousal support and awarded minimal attorney fees.
The 10-year statute of limitations on a claim relating to a property settlement in a judgment of divorce begins to run at the time the claim accrues and that the claim accrues when the money owing under the property settlement comes due.
The only fact the trial court used to rule that defendant should receive 25% of the value was that he contributed and sacrificed little to the Book of Business and this was not a concerted effort.
Plaintiff moved to set aside the revised proposed QDRO, arguing that it was time-barred under the ten-year statute of limitations set forth in MCL 600.5809(3).
Defendant argues that the trial court’s 60/40 distribution of the marital estate in plaintiff’s favor was inappropriately punitive. According to defendant, the trial court placed a disproportionate amount of weight on the parties’ respective fault, while ignoring defendant’s significant financial contributions to the marital estate.
When dividing property in a divorce, trial courts must first determine marital and separate assets.
Plaintiff, age 67 at the time of divorce, and defendant, age 59 at the time of divorce, were married for 23 years. The judgment of divorce provides for a division of property. Defendant appeals arguing that the trial court erred in determining the...
Plaintiff and defendant were married in 1995 when they were in their mid-50s and after both of their first marriages ended. At the time of marriage, defendant had an IRA valued at approximately $800,000. After three years of marriage, due to a...
Plaintiff filed for divorce in October 2012 after confirming that her husband (defendant) had been having an affair with his former co-worker. After the proceedings began, plaintiff learned that the defendant had given former co-worker hundreds of...
Plaintiff appeals the judgment of divorce that awarded defendant 50% of the equity in the marital home, all of workers' compensation benefits, and certain personal property items. Court affirmed the trial court's division of the financial assets of...
The parties divorced and the trial court handled the distribution of property as well as spousal and child support. On appeal, the court rejected plaintiff's argument that the trial court's distribution of the marital property was not equitable....
Thus, it vacated the order awarding attorney fees and remanded for further proceedings on this issue, but otherwise affirmed. As to the application of the Sparks factors, while "defendant received significantly more property than plaintiff" under...
The court held that the trial court did not err by allocating two assets to the defendant-ex-husband without including their value in the marital estate. However, it noted that based on the trial court's failure to make findings on the Sparks...
The plaintiff-ex-husband argued that the trial court's division of the marital estate was inequitable because the defendant-ex-wife received a car and a share of his retirement and pension benefits, while he was encumbered with the entire amount of...
Plaintiff argued that the trial court clearly erred when it awarded defendant $5,700 for her share of the Harley. He contended that the parties had an agreement as to the Harley, pursuant to which he would be awarded the Harley and defendant would...
The parties raised several issues as to whether certain property was separate property or marital property subject to division. The defendant-ex-wife argued that her premarital Gentex stock was erroneously classified as marital property. The trial...
