At the jurisdictional trial, H admitted that she had a substance abuse addiction that somewhat affected her ability to parent her children. The trial court ordered that CKM would remain with M until the custody hearing in a few months.
The trial court held that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to modify the out-of-state spousal-support order. The trial court denied the plaintiff’s motion to terminate spousal support.
Father and mother’s relationship involved domestic violence, and they both abused substances.
The court recognize that defendant has made great strides in her sobriety. But the Child Custody Act requires courts to focus on the best interest of the children and to provide a stable environment for children that is free of unwarranted custody changes.
The trial court found that clear and convincing evidence established that a change of custody was in AH’s best interests, noting the parties were unable or unwilling to work together to reach an agreement on AH’s education and medical treatment.
The referee recommended that the trial court grant plaintiff’s request for enforcement of the judgment and require the parties to comply with its provisions and further recommended that plaintiff’s request for attorney fees be preserved and awarded should plaintiff have to return to court.
The referee found that the support amount calculated under the MCSF would be unjust and inappropriate, and that a deviation of $750 was warranted.
The referee ultimately determined that neither party had established grounds for changing custody and that plaintiff had not established her intended move to Minnesota was in the best interests of the two youngest children.
The trial court discussed the difference between the parties’ care for WPS’s medical needs, noting plaintiff was much more involved and defendant’s refusal to provide his schedule contributed to his own frustrations regarding his lack of involvement.
The court determined that plaintiff had established by clear and convincing evidence that the change of domicile was in the best interests of the children.
The trial court credited plaintiff’s testimony that, before the parties’ separation, defendant spent minimal time helping to care for the children, so its finding that the children would not have looked to defendant for guidance, discipline, the necessities of life, and parental comfort during that time was not against the great weight of the evidence.
By the time of the trial court’s order, custody and parenting time of the children had been governed by the interim order for nearly a year. The trial court was appropriately mindful that from the children’s perspective, any change to their established custodial environment should be minimal.
The change in custody and parenting time was primarily brought about by evidence that defendant repeatedly disobeyed court orders and parenting-time rules, prioritized his personal vendettas, and continuously made unsupported allegations that plaintiff and her family were abusive.
When parents are unable to cooperate and make joint decisions, a trial court may be required to grant sole custody to one parent.
In addition, the trial court noted that plaintiff did not have the means to pay spousal support because she had substantial debt and was financially supporting her unemployed adult son.
The petitioner bears the burden of establishing reasonable cause for issuance of a PPO, and of establishing a justification for the continuance of a PPO at a hearing on the respondent’s motion to terminate the PPO.
A trial court has discretion to terminate a parent’s rights and permit a stepparent to adopt a child when the conditions of MCL 710.51(6) are met. MCL 710.51(6)(b) requires the petitioner to establish that the other parent had the ability to visit, contact, or communicate with the children, and substantially failed or neglected to do so for a period of two years.
However, the trial court concluded that these matters should, in fact, be in the province and the jurisdiction of the Family Division and in that respect, having issued a personal protection order, the Court stated it would terminate the personal protection order after the parties present documentation of the initiation of the divorce proceedings.
Defendant also argued that SG’s attainment of school age was a change of circumstances; however, the fact that a child has grown old enough to attend school is a normal life change.
The arbitration agreement broadly granted the arbitrator the authority to decide the post judgment of divorce issues that were pending before the trial court.
The trial court noted plaintiff’s testimony that the move was designed to provide KSJ with more stability, however, that since the evidentiary hearing, plaintiff’s employment changed again, with her new work hours resulting in frustrating the current parenting time exchange schedule.
In Michigan, the Child Custody Act of 1970 (CCA) governs custody, parenting time, and child support issues for minor children; it is the exclusive means by which to pursue child custody rights.
The trial court entered a consent judgment of divorce, awarding sole legal and physical custody of the children to mother, but awarding father supervised parenting time.
Respondent moved to terminate the PPO. Respondent asserted that petitioner’s allegations were false. A proceeding on respondent’s motion to terminate was held with a family court referee, not a trial court judge.
For joint custody to work, parents must be able to agree with each other on basic issues in child rearing including health care, religion, education, day to day decision making and discipline and they must be willing to cooperate with each other in joint decision making. If two equally capable parents are unable to cooperate and to agree generally concerning important decisions affecting the welfare of their children, the court has no alternative but to determine which parent shall have sole custody of the children.
Petitioner and respondent were previously married and were divorced at the time that the petitions were filed. Respondent’s parental rights to both RP and HP were terminated in May 2018. Respondent had little to no contact with the minor...
The trial court’s decision not to impute income to the work to render it essentially an obligation, and instead to condition spousal support payments on whether plaintiff chose to accept contract work was not outside the range of reasonable outcomes.
The trial court found that the parties mutually agreed to place the children in school in Michigan upon J’s move to California. That decision changed the children’s lives.
The parties were married for five and a half years with only one child, divorcing in December 2018. Plaintiff continued to live in the marital home in Washtenaw County after defendant moved out. Following the divorce, defendant moved to Fowlerville....
An established custodial environment may exist in more than one home and can be established as a result of a temporary custody order, in violation of a custody order, or in the absence of a custody order.
Plaintiff retains the right to oppose recognition and enforcement of the India divorce decree. However, whether the India divorce decree should be recognized and enforced in Michigan can only be determined after it has been issued.
The parties married in 2013 while in Florida. Plaintiff was originally from Michigan, and defendant was originally from New Jersey. The child, JV, was born in 2014. The parties separated approximately one year later. The Florida courts granted the...
The record reflects that plaintiff refused to cooperate with defendant regarding defendant’s parenting time until the circuit court intervened to enforce defendant’s rights.
The trial court found that plaintiff was not willing or able to facilitate and encourage a close and continuing relationship between JB and defendant.
A consent judgment of divorce is to be construed as a contract and to be applied as such. Likewise, a property settlement agreement in a divorce is construed as a contract.
Before considering a change of custody, a trial court must find that there has been a change of circumstances or proper cause.
Originally posted on 11/07/2016
Whether you a father seeking more parenting time and decision-making power in your child’s life, or you are a mother who is fearful of losing a child, custody battles bring out the worst fears...
D and T began a relationship when D was separated from his wife. After T became pregnant with the minor child, D and his wife reconciled. A few months after the minor child was born.
In May 2015, an order was entered with the consent of the...
The court also found that defendant was largely at fault for the dissolution of the marriage because of his infidelity. The court determined that a 55/45 split of the marital estate in favor of plaintiff was appropriate considering the relevant factors.
In order to give deference to the decisions of fit parents, it is presumed that a fit parent’s decision to deny grandparenting time does not create a substantial risk of harm to the child’s mental, physical, or emotional health.
