Defendant developed the Stone Valley Development, a residential development, and conveyed to plaintiffs by warranty deeds Lots 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6. The Stone Valley Development is subject to a Declaration of Easements and Restrictive Covenants (DERC)...
BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs’ suit primarily alleges that defendant is conducting rental activity on its property in violation of the Manchester Township Zoning Ordinance (MTZO). Plaintiffs requested an order enjoining defendant from operating a...
This cause of action arises from plaintiffs’ purchase of a residence from defendant, who had rights in the house under a land contract from co-defendant, the legal owner of the house. Before the house was for sale, in January 2018, an upstairs...
BACKGROUND
Many of the facts are undisputed. In November 2007, Defendant entered into a mortgage agreement with Plaintiff, in which Defendant agreed to lend Plaintiff $500,000 secured by certain real property located in Livingston County. Both...
BACKGROUND
On May 5, 2014, the parties entered into a land contract for the sale of real property from defendant to plaintiff. In the land contract, plaintiff...
BACKGROUND
The Court needed to determine the actual extent of an easement for a drain that runs across the southern edge of the plaintiff’s property. The releases at issue conveyed rights to fifty-foot strips of land on either side of the...
BACKGROUND
On March 12, 2016, the parties entered into an agreement for the purchase of defendants’ home. The purchase agreement contained the following clause: TIME FOR LEGAL ACTION: Buyer and Seller agree that any legal action against...
In June 2012, plaintiff purchased real property in Michigan. Over a year later plaintiff was arrested on federal charges related to drug trafficking. Since his arrest, plaintiff has remained incarcerated.
During his first week in jail, he was...
This action for breach of contract, negligence, and abuse of process arises from the construction of a home.
Failure to Pay Property Taxes
During the construction, plaintiff failed to pay the property taxes, and the county foreclosed on the...
This case concerns the enforceability of an amended condominium bylaw prohibiting short-term rentals where such rentals had been expressly contemplated and allowed under an existing 15-year contract between the owner of a condominium unit and a...
Plaintiffs purchased a home in Michigan. At the time of the sale, the owners of the home, defendants, had been suffering from dementia for several months and were living in assisted-living facilities. Their daughter, defendant L, as their power of...
The Plaintiffs purchased the property in question in 1992. The property is zoned C-1, commercial district, and may be used for retail sales of goods and services. From 1992 to 2006, the Plaintiffs operated a ceramics shop in the commercial building...
The question presented by the case is whether the operation of a MMCC at this location complies with Section 61-3-354(b)(1) of the Detroit Zoning Ordinance, which prohibits the BSEED from approving any request for a MMCC where located within a drug-free zone.
At issue is whether the color bar and reception desk were the Salon’s trade fixtures. The court found that SOF owned the color bar and reception desk because they were fixtures attached to the premises.
In reaching this conclusion, the trial court relied upon the 2013 warranty deed documents that twice expressly provided the 2005 Easement superseded the Original Easement. Review of the 2005 Amendment demonstrated that every aspect of the Original Easement was expressly repeated, modified, or omitted. Nothing in the language of the 2005 Amendment suggests that it is intended to be read in conjunction with the Original Easement.
Defendant’s legal position is that the option to buy expired at midnight on April 22, 2017, and the lack of any tender of payment by that time means the option expired and plaintiff forfeited all rights to the property.
Plaintiff and defendants agree that there was no writing in this case. Thus, the agreement’s terms determine whether it falls within the statute of frauds.
Governmental entities are generally immune from tort liability. A governmental entity can only be subject to suit if a plaintiff’s case falls within a statutory exception. As such, it is the responsibility of the party seeking to impose liability on a governmental agency to demonstrate that its case falls within one of the exceptions.
The second amendment to the lease was not provided to plaintiff during the negotiations.
Creating a mutually beneficial real estate deal usually goes through smoothly with both sides presenting their interests then negotiating toward a middle ground they can both agree to uphold. Unfortunately, not all deals go through without an issue....
The party claiming a prescriptive easement has the burden of establishing entitlement to the prescriptive easement by clear and cogent evidence. An easement by prescription results from use of another’s property that is open, notorious, adverse, and continuous for a period of fifteen years.
Even viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, the deeds make it clear that neither plaintiffs nor their predecessors ever had an ownership interest in the western 10 feet of Lot 56.
A party may file a third-party claim as of right within 21 days after his or her original answer is due. Otherwise, leave on motion with notice to all parties is required.
The doctrine of acquiescence provides that, where adjoining property owners acquiesce to a boundary line for a period of at least fifteen years, that line becomes the actual boundary line. The underlying reason for the rule of acquiescence is the promotion of peaceful resolution of boundary disputes.
MCL 566.132(2) provides an action shall not be brought against a financial institution to enforce any of the following promises or commitments of the financial institution unless the promise or commitment is in writing and signed with an authorized signature by the financial institution.
Plaintiffs took possession of the property on or about May 1, 2017. Shortly thereafter, plaintiffs contacted the Defendants and asked for certain fixtures to be returned. The Defendants refused, stating that the fixtures were not part of the sale.
The trial court held that in the absence of a written agreement, plaintiff was not entitled to have the house conveyed to her because an oral agreement to transfer the house was barred by the statute of frauds. The trial court entered an order dismissing plaintiff’s claim for quiet title to the house and dismissing defendant’s counterclaim.
Defendant contends that LLC did not provide him with adequate notice of its claim for possession
MCL 211.7cc(2) provides that an owner of property can claim the PRE by filing an affidavit that must state that the property is owned and occupied as a principal residence by that owner of the property on the date that the affidavit is signed and shall state that the owner has not claimed a substantially similar exemption, deduction, or credit on property in another state.
A motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) should be granted if the evidence submitted by the parties fails to establish a genuine issue of a material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment or partial judgment as a matter of law.
The land contract stated that T Company sold real property to plaintiff. The land contract further stated that if plaintiff failed to make a monthly payment, T Company could execute the quitclaim deed, thereby terminating plaintiff’s rights to the real property under the land contract.
The trial court granted defendants’ motion for summary disposition, concluding that the claims against the realty companies were barred by the valid release contained in the purchase agreement and that the claims against sellers were required to be resolved in arbitration because they fell within the scope of the arbitration clause in the purchase agreement.
When the statutory requirements for mortgage foreclosure are met, a trial court generally lacks authority to set aside a foreclosure sale except in a strong case of fraud or irregularity.
Plaintiff’s interest in the subject property is best characterized as a remainder estate, because her right to possession of the property was postponed until the occurrence of a specific contingency, that being the deaths of the grandparents. Plaintiff pursued this action within the 15-year limitation period; accordingly, this action is not barred by MCL 600.5801(4).
Accordingly, plaintiffs requested declaratory relief, allowing them to make the proposed modifications to the easement as depicted in the gravel drive improvement plan and prohibiting the defendants from interfering with their maintenance of the easement.
The trial court then entered an order settling the consent judgment, which stated that the parties stipulated, on the record, to settle plaintiff’s inverse condemnation claim for $10,000, and that the settlement was approved by defendant’s city council.
The statute only applies to any surplus money after satisfying the mortgage on which the real estate was sold. Therefore, for the Petitioners to be entitled to anything under MCL 600.3252, the mortgage on the Southfield property must have been satisfied and there must be surplus money remaining after the mortgage is satisfied.
An entity’s bylaws are a contractual agreement between the entity and its members. Condominium association bylaws constitute a binding contractual agreement between the governing entity and its members to the extent that the bylaws do not conflict with or are not inconsistent with state law.
Plaintiffs requested that the trial court, either through reformation of the First Easement or interpretation of the Second Easement, quiet title in favor of plaintiffs and declare them to be the owners of an easement to access Lake Superior through the ravine on defendants’ property, enjoin defendants from interfering with their use of the easement, and order compensation for damages to the stairs.
Defendants completed the project. Plaintiff did not pay for any of the costs of the project. Defendants moved to compel plaintiff to pay one-half of the costs under the agreement. Plaintiff responded that defendants had materially breached the agreement in several ways, including by denying her the right to supervise the project, by refusing to give her an installation schedule, and by starting work before plaintiff approved of the start date.
